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29 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights: Amend Chapter 11 of Title 15, Title 
17, and Article 3 of Chapter 9 of Title 24 of the Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated, Relating to Juvenile Proceedings, Criminal 
Procedure, and Examination of Witnesses, Respectively, so as to 
Expand Provisions Relative to Victims’ Participation in the Court 
System in Juvenile and State Courts; Change Provisions Relating 
to Victim Impact Statements in Delinquency Proceedings; Provide 
That Victims May Be Present in Juvenile Court Hearings; Require 
Courts to Hear Victim Impact Testimony; Require the Court to 
Make a Finding Regarding Restitution in Sentencing Every 
Accused Person; Add Legislative Findings to the “Crime Victims’ 
Bill of Rights”; Define Certain Terms; Expand the List of Crimes 
Covered by the “Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights”; Change Provisions 
Relating to Victim Notification to the Victim of Matters Relative to 
a Criminal Case; Provide for Victim Notification of Events When 
an Accused Is Committed to the Department of Behavioral Health 
and Developmental Disabilities; Change Provisions Relating to the 
Prosecuting Attorney’s Duties Relative to Victim Notification and 
Provide for Notice to Victims Relating to Restitution; Provide for 
Procedures for a Victim to be Interviewed by an Accused or His or 
Her Attorney or Agent; Require That Victims of Crimes be Present 
in the Courtroom Except Under Limited Circumstances; Change 
Provisions Relative to the Rule of Sequestration; Provide Privilege 
Protections to Communications between Victim Assistance 
Personnel and Victims; Require the Attorney General to Notify 
Prosecuting Attorneys of Certain Matters in Death Penalty Cases; 
Provide for Victims to Prevent an Accused from Sending Any Form 
of Written, Text, or Electronic Communication to Such Victim, the 
Victim’s Family, or the Victim’s Household; Article 3 of Chapter 5 
of Title 42 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to 
Conditions of Detention, so as to Change Certain Provisions 
Relating to Transmittal of Information on Convicted Persons and 
Place of Detention; Change the provision that Allows Convicted 
Persons to Remain in Local Jails under Certain Circumstances; 
Provide for Related Matters; Repeal Conflicting Laws; and for 
Other Purposes. 
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CODE SECTION: O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-64.2, -78, -155 
(amended); 17-10-1.2 (amended); 17-
14-3 (amended); 17-17-1, -3, -5 
(amended); 17-17-5.1 (new); 17-17-8 
(amended); 17-17-8.1 (new); 17-17-9 
(amended); 17-17-9.1 (new); 17-17-12 
(amended); 17-17-12.1 (new); 24-9-
61.1 (amended); 42-5-50 (amended) 
BILL NUMBER: HB 567 
ACT NUMBER: 403 
GEORGIA LAWS: 2010 Ga. Laws 214 
SUMMARY: The Act provides for crime victims’ 
rights in Georgia and creates 
substantive mechanisms for directing 
agencies to carry out these rights. It 
establishes comprehensive reform 
providing nine basic victims’ rights. 
These include the right to be present 
and heard in the sentencing phase of a 
criminal proceeding against the 
accused, including proceedings in 
juvenile court. The Act also provides 
that victims must be notified regarding 
the disposition of criminal proceedings 
or the status of the accused, such as 
release or escape, and requires the 
prosecuting attorney or the corrections 
department to provide such notice. 
Judges are also required to make a 
finding in every case as to whether 
restitution to the victim from the 
accused is appropriate. Further, it 
provides that the victim may refuse an 
interview from an agent (such as an 
attorney) of the accused and that such 
an agent must clearly identify that he 
represents the accused. Victims and 
families are also protected against 
contact from the accused. Finally, the 
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Act provides for changes relating to the 
transportation of convicted persons to 
correctional institutions.   
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 2010 
History 
The Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights provides that victims of crime 
and their families have rights including the following: to be heard in 
court; to have a hearing on restitution where appropriate; and to be 
notified regarding the status of the accused or convicted offender.1 
Additionally, the Act, for the first time, expands the victims’ right to 
be heard during juvenile proceedings.2 In its final form, House Bill 
(HB) 567 passed with little opposition in the House by 158 “yeas” to 
1 “nay”3 and passed unanimously in the Senate.4 The bill, however, 
went through numerous changes and faced stiff opposition, primarily 
based on a controversial version of Section 11 included in the bill’s 
earlier versions.5 Work on crafting legislation covering victims’ 
rights actually began sometime in June 2009, when a group of 
legislators were instructed to create a draft of the potential bill to be 
introduced.6  
Victim impact statements previously were disfavored at law. Prior 
to the 1990s, victim impact statements were not allowed to influence 
sentencing in Georgia courts. In the 1974 Muckle v. State decision, 
the Georgia Supreme Court reversed a life imprisonment sentence 
                                                                                                                 
 1. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1 (Supp. 2010). 
 2. Id. § 15-11-64.2(d); see also Video Recording of House of Representatives Judiciary Non-Civil 
Committee Proceedings, Jan. 5, 2010 at 26 min., 39 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting 
Attorneys’ Council), 
http://media.legis.ga.gov/hav/09/comm/judynon/judynon010509.wmv [hereinafter House Comm. Jan. 5 
Video]. Code section 17-17-1 does not apply to juvenile court proceedings. See 1996 Ga. Op. Att’y Gen. 
U96-1. 
 3. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 567 (Mar. 26, 2010). 
 4. Georgia Senate Voting Record, HB 567 (Apr. 14, 2010).  
 5. See Telephone Interview with Don Samuel, Partner, Garland, Samuel and Loeb, Member, 
Georgia Association of Defense Attorneys (Apr. 1, 2010) (on file with the Georgia State University Law 
Review) [hereinafter Samuel Interview]; see also HB 567 (LC 29 4112ERS), § 11, p. 10–11, ln. 337–60, 
2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. (deleted subsection Section 11(f) which provided for contempt of court for 
attorneys who violated this Act).  
 6. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 15 min., 6 sec. (remarks by Subcomm. Chairman 
Rep. Rich Golick (R-34th)). 
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imposed on a rapist and remanded for a new sentencing.7 The rape 
victim’s husband and her university professor were allowed to testify 
as to her change in personality and decreased academic performance 
following the attack.8 Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court held 
that current Georgia law did not allow the “severity of the 
punishment [to] depend on the emotional state of the unfortunate 
victim.”9 
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was once construed to disallow victim impact statements 
in capital murder trials.10 In Booth v. Maryland, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that allowing victim impact statements would cause the 
death penalty to be imposed in an arbitrary manner: some victims 
either would not leave behind a family or be less articulate in 
describing their loss even if it was equally severe to the loss of 
others.11 Likewise, the Court was concerned that such evidence 
shifted focus away from the defendant and what he knew when he 
committed the crime.12 Relying on Booth, the Supreme Court in 
South Carolina v. Gathers affirmed that a prosecutor engaged in 
improper conduct during a capital murder prosecution, when he read 
from the religious literature a murder victim carried at the time of his 
death and inferred positive qualities about him.13 
The Supreme Court reversed itself a short time later in Payne v. 
Tennessee.14 The majority held that “the Eight Amendment erects no 
per se bar” to victim impact statements.15 The Court reasoned that it 
was unfair to allow the defendant to put on mitigating evidence about 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Muckle v. State, 233 Ga. 337, 338, 211 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1974).  
 8. Id. at 337, 362.  
 9. Id. at 339, 363. 
 10. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 
(1991). The Booth Court relied on the Eight Amendment of the United States Constitution, “Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 11. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505–06.  
 12. Id. at 505. 
 13. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811–12 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808 (1991). Moreover, the Court held that it was also misconduct to infer positive qualities based 
on the voter registration card that the victim had in his papers at the time of his murder. Id. 
 14. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 15. Id. at 827. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion was joined by two other Justices and stated 
that Booth both “significantly harms our criminal justice system and is egregiously wrong” and had 
“plainly inadequate rational support.” Id. at 834 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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his good character while denying victims or their survivors a chance 
to express the impact or loss caused by the defendant’s actions.16 The 
Court expressed the need to right the unfairness caused by Booth by 
quoting Justice Cardozo: “[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due 
to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it 
is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.”17 
Georgia law, nevertheless, continued to disallow victim impact 
statements as late as 1992.18 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Payne that the Eighth Amendment 
was no “per se bar” to victim impact statements, but still found that 
then-codified Georgia law did not allow evidence of the 
psychological impact of the crime on the victim.19 The Georgia high 
court noted that Muckle v. State was “intended to avoid confusion and 
prejudicial digression in sentencing.”20 The next year, the Georgia 
legislature changed the law, specifically allowing for victim impact 
statements in death penalty cases at the discretion of the trial judge so 
long as they did not “inflame or unduly prejudice the jury.”21 The 
law, nonetheless, was not applicable to juvenile court proceedings.22 
In terms of providing rights beyond victim impact statements, 
Georgia’s previous Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights has been described 
by Spencer Lawton from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council as “a 
triumph of sentiment over substance.”23 While it pointed to the 
various rights that crime victims have, the previous Code did little to 
nothing in the way of directing the different agencies in how to 
provide those rights.24 This rendered the legislation ineffective in 
living up to its promise. 
HB 567 was introduced by Representatives Don Parsons (R-42nd) 
and Wendell Willard (R-49th) in the 2009 legislative session.25 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See id. at 825–27 (majority opinion).  
 17. Id. at 827 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)).  
 18. Sermons v. State, 262 Ga. 286, 417 S.E.2d 144 (1992).  
 19. Id. at 287–88. 
 20. Id. 
 21. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2(a)(2) (Supp. 2009). 
 22. 1996 Op. Ga. Att’y Gen. U96-1, available at http://law.ga.gov/00/opinion_print/ 
0,2669,87670814_90686057_109614944,00.html. 
 23. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 23 min., 51 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council).  
 24. Id. at 23 min., 51 sec. 
 25. HB 567 Bill Tracking, supra note 4.  
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Representative Parsons introduced the bill after receiving a call from 
a Cobb County constituent who was the father of a homicide victim.26 
Dr. Bruce Cook and Mr. Gordon Rondo, members of the Georgia 
Crime Victim’s Advocacy Council, wanted Georgia to have a 
victims’ bill of rights modeled after similar legislation in other states 
and at the federal level.27  
The Georgia bill is modeled heavily after the federal crime 
victims’ rights statute passed in 2004.28 The federal legislation itself 
appears to be based on a series of amendments made to state 
constitutions, including Arizona, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas, 
starting in 1988.29 Many states, however, provide rights by statute to 
crime victims. For example, in 1994, Kentucky was the first to 
provide automated telephone information to crime victims regarding 
the status of the offender.30 
After agreeing to take up the bill on behalf of his constituents, 
Representative Parsons decided he needed to work with a lawyer who 
had experience on the Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, where this 
type of legislation is written.31 He then took the idea of a crime 
victims’ bill to Representative Willard, who was very supportive.32 
Willard encouraged Representative Parsons to proceed with the 
legislation saying, “I think we can probably do some things to 
strengthen victims’ rights.”33 Both agreed that the central thrust of the 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See Interview with Rep. Don Parsons, in Atlanta, Ga. (R-42nd) (Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter 
Parsons Interview].  
 27. See id.; Telephone Interview with Dr. Bruce Cook, Crime Victim’s Advocacy Council (May 5, 
2010) [hereinafter Cook Interview]; see also Video Recording of House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee 
Proceedings, Mar. 17, 2010 at 21 min., 23 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’ 
Council), http://media.legis.ga.gov/hav/09/ comm/judynon/judynon031710.wmv [hereinafter House 
Comm. Mar. 17 Video]. 
 28. See Parsons Interview, supra note 26; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. 2009). 
 29. Michigan was the first to ratify the language into their constitution in 1988. MICH CONST. art. I, 
§ 24. Arizona ratified very similar language into their state constitution in 1990. ARIZ . CONST. art. II, § 
2.1. Illinois followed suit in 1992. ILL CONST. art. I, § 8.1. Around the same time period, many states 
were adopting constitutional amendments to protect the rights of crime victims, though not necessarily 
based on similar wording. See Maryland Crime Victims’ Resource Center, Inc., The History of Crime 
Victims' Rights In America, http://www.mdcrimevictims.org/_pages/e_legislation_policy/ 
e2_legis_federal.htm (last visited Jun. 26, 2010); see also Parsons Interview, supra note 26. 
 30. National Center for Victims of Crime, Crime Victims’ Rights in America: A Historical Overview, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/ncvrw/1999/histr.htm; see also Maryland Crime Victims’ Resource 
Center, Inc., supra note 29. 
 31. See Parsons Interview, supra note 26. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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bill would be to increase the role of victims in the criminal justice 
system in proceedings that affect them.34  
Bill Tracking 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representatives Don Parsons (R-42nd) and Wendell Willard (R-
49th), respectively, sponsored HB 567.35 The House of 
Representatives read the bill for the first time on February 26, 2009,36 
and for the second time on March 3, 2009.37 After Speaker of the 
House David Ralston (R-7th) assigned it to the Ramsey 
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, the bill was 
favorably reported on March 18, 2009.38  
The bill, as introduced, focused on clarifying the rights of victims 
in the criminal justice system.39 In the original Code section 17-17-1 
(1995), the legislature set out the policy that victims “should be 
accorded certain basic rights just as the accused are accorded certain 
basic rights,”40 but did not specifically enumerate those rights.41  
 Victims’ Rights and Assertion Issues 
Code section 17-17-1 went through several changes in the House. 
In the first version of the bill, eight specific rights of victims’ were 
added to the Code section:42  
the right to be reasonably protected from the accused,43 the right 
to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  
 36. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 567, Apr. 29, 2010. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See HB 567 (LC35 1317), Preamble, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 40. 1995 Ga. Laws 385, § 2, at 385 (formerly codified at O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1 (Supp. 2009)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.1, ln. 16–41, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 43. There was a brief discussion about using the term ‘accused’ to refer to the criminal defendant, 
while using the more definite term  ‘victim’ to refer to the citizen who is believed to have suffered the 
criminal conduct. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 55 min., 10 sec. (remarks by Rep. Bobby 
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proceeding involving the crime perpetuated against them or of 
any release or escape of the accused; the right not to be excluded 
from any such public proceeding, unless the court, after 
receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that 
testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim 
heard testimony from a witness; the right to be heard at any 
public proceeding involving the release, plea, sentencing, or 
parole of the accused; the right to confer with the attorney for the 
state in any criminal prosecution related to the state; the right to 
restitution as provided by law; the right to proceedings free from 
unreasonable delay; and the right to be treated fairly and with 
respect for the victim's dignity.44 
The next portion of amendments to Code section 17-17-1 in the 
bill, as introduced, addressed who could assert these rights. They 
could be asserted by victims, their agents, or prosecutors.45 The court 
to address these claims would be the one in which the accused was 
being prosecuted, or if no prosecution was currently under way, then 
the court with jurisdiction over the location of the crime would 
address the issues.46 The remaining portion of this section granted 
victims a fairly broad power to challenge a denial of their rights 
under this section by the court.47 The victim was able to petition the 
Court of Appeals to issue a writ of mandamus contesting the 
decision.48 If the writ issued, the court would be required to decide its 
application within seventy-two hours.49  
This entire portion of changes to Code section 17-17-1 was deleted 
in the next version of the bill, partly due to concerns that the victims 
                                                                                                                 
Franklin (R-43rd), Subcomm. Chairman Rep. Rich Golick (R-34th), and Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting 
Attorneys’ Council). Both terms were kept as consistent with proper technical legal structure. Id. 
Representative Franklin subsequently sponsored HB 1181 along with Representative Charlice Byrd (R-
20th), Representative Mark Hatfield (R-177th), Representative Tom Knox (R-24th), and Representative 
Randal Mangham (D-94th). State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1181, Apr. 29, 2010. 
HB 1181 sought to change the word ‘victim’ to ‘accuser’ throughout the Georgia criminal code in 
situations where a criminal conviction had not been returned against the defendant; however, the bill 
only made it to a second reading on February 17, 2010, and did not survive Cross-Over Day. Id. 
 44. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.1, ln. 16–41, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 45. Id. § 1, p.1, ln. 42–43. 
 46. Id. § 1, p.1, ln. 29–34. 
 47. Id. § 1, p.2, ln. 37–41. 
 48. Id. § 1, p.1, ln. 47–49.  
 49. Id. § 1, p.2, ln. 49–51. 
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would be “transformed into a party to the criminal action and have an 
independent right to sue the judges or any other actors in the criminal 
justice system, where they feel their rights have been abused.”50  
The original bill also amended Code section 17-17-15, which 
curtailed the right granted in the introduced version of Code section 
17-17-1 for victims to challenge a decision that denied them their 
rights:51 
[I]n no case shall a failure to afford a right under this chapter 
provide grounds for a new trial; provided, however, that in any 
appeal in a criminal case, the prosecutor may assert as error the 
court's denial of any crime victim's right in the [case] to which 
the appeal relates.52 
The rest of this section stated that although the victim does not 
have standing to participate as a party to the criminal action, they 
may file a motion contesting the plea or sentence if these 
requirements are met:  
(1) The victim has asserted the right to be heard before or during 
the proceeding at issue and such right was denied;  
(2) The victim petitions the Court of Appeals for a writ of 
mandamus within ten days; and  
(3) In the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to the highest 
offense charged.53 
All of the revisions made to Code section 17-17-15 were deleted in 
the next version of HB 567.54  
The Committee was also concerned about victims being granted 
the right to file complaints, which it addressed in the amendments to 
Code section 15-11-64.2 regarding juvenile proceedings55 and Code 
                                                                                                                 
 50. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 29 min., 25 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). 
 51. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 6, p.5, ln. 138–57, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 52. Id. § 6, p.5, ln. 143–46. 
 53. Id. § 6, p.5, ln. 149–53. 
 54. Compare id. with HB 567 (LC29 4284S), 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 55. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.2, ln. 37–41, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
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section 17-10-1.2 regarding adult proceedings.56 There was debate 
during the January 5, 2010 meeting of the House Judiciary Non-Civil 
Committee about whether the legislature has the authority to permit 
such complaints to be filed. Representative Kevin Levitas (D-82nd) 
expressed concern about potential separation of powers issues created 
by the provision: 
I don’t know that the legislature can declare to the court what a 
violation of a judicial canon is. [T]here might be a way to reword 
that, but I do not believe we have the power, the legislature, to 
declare [whether] a judicial canon . . . [has] been 
violated . . . . [M]y concern is obviously we need to have a 
constitutional amendment for doing that. . . . [I]t definitely seems 
that sometimes judges need a little guiding hand to make sure 
they stick to the law, but the question is how we do that. What I 
don’t want to do is pass this bill only to have somebody bring a 
constitutional objection to it and have it overturned.57 
Chairman Golick expressed similar concerns, noting that “[the 
judges will] probably bristle at the audacity of us to say something is 
a violation.”58 Lawton assured the committee that there have been 
instances in the past where the legislature established violations, so 
this provision should not be objectionable.59 
                                                                                                                 
 56. HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 4, p.4, ln. 155–57, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.  
 57. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 27 min., 56 sec (remarks by Rep. Kevin Levitas (D-
82nd)). 
 58. Id. at 32 min., 10 sec (remarks by Subcomm. Chairman Rep. Rich Golick (R-34th)). 
Representative Bob Franklin (R-43rd) questioned the level of deference granted to judges, saying, “[I]f a 
judge violates a right, why should the judge be immune simply because he wears a state-issued 
costume?” Id. at 35 min., 23 sec. 
 59. Id. at 27 min., 56 sec (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). But see id. 
at 52 min., 12 sec (remarks by Jill Travis, House Legislative Counsel) (“I just wanted to add . . . that [on 
the] concern about the code of judicial conduct, I did search the code and violating the canons is in fact 
nowhere else in the code; this would be new. And because the [Georgia] Supreme Court issues the 
judicial canon[s] . . . I do have concerns about this provision.”). 
  Golick stated that this issue would be discussed in more detail later in the committee meeting, 
but this problem was in fact never addressed again during the January 5, 2010 meeting. Id. at 53 min., 10 
sec. (remarks by Subcomm. Chairman Rep. Rich Golick (R-34th)). 
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 Procedures and Process 
The bill, as introduced, amended Code section 17-17-6 to add that 
during law enforcement or court personnel’s initial contact with the 
victim, the victim should be given information about the potential 
availability of restitution where applicable.60 This emphasis on 
restitution corresponds with the original inclusion of restitution as a 
victim’s right in the amended Code section 17-17-161 and with a 
section added by the House Subcommittee in a later version of the 
bill, which requires the court to set a specific dollar amount when 
ordering the restitution owed to the victim.62 All of the revisions 
made to Code section 17-17-6 in this section were deleted in the next 
version of HB 567.63 
 Victim Notification  
The bill, as introduced, amended Code section 17-17-13 to provide 
that when an accused is convicted, the prosecutor is required to notify 
victims of their right to be notified of any impending clemency or 
release proceedings related to the accused.64 These revisions to Code 
section 17-17-13 were deleted in the Act.65 
Concerns about efficiency with notification were expressed in 
response to the language in the introduced amendments to Code 
section 17-17-5.66 The existing Code section 17-17-12 provided that 
victims only needed to be notified of appellate proceedings handled 
by the Attorney General in death penalty cases,67 but the original bill 
language would have expanded the duty to include, in addition to 
capital cases, “other violent offense[s] against the victim, including, 
but not limited to, assault, battery, child molestation, rape, or other 
                                                                                                                 
 60. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 3, p. 3, ln. 72, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 61. Id. § 1, p.1, ln. 39.  
 62. O.C.G.A. § 17-14-3(a) (Supp. 2010). 
 63. Compare HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 3, p. 3, ln. 72, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. with HB 567 (LC29 
4284S), 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.  
 64. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 4, p.4, ln. 129–30, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 65. Compare id. with HB 567 (LC35 1866S), 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 66.  House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1 hr., 41 min., 3 sec. (remarks by unnamed Parole 
Board representative). 
 67. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-12 (Supp. 2009). 
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sexual assault,”68 no matter what sentence was given.69 The Parole 
Board voiced concerns as to the potential ramifications of this 
language during the January 5, 2010 House Judiciary Non-Civil 
Committee proceedings:  
That’s very broad language . . . . [and] difficult because we have 
a lot of situations where the person has technically violated the 
terms of the electronic monitoring if they get home from 
work . . . late, and I don't think that would . . . make 
sense . . . [to] notif[y] in those circumstances. Another instance 
would be if they’re on parole [for] br[eaking] into [a] shed and 
st[ealing] a lawnmower then . . . . we would be notifying . . . [the 
victim]. [W]e recommend[] . . . refined language to narrow 
it . . . to where there is a victim, and it is a serious violation of 
their electronic monitoring requirements.70   
In response, the committee added language requiring notification 
of when the defendant violates the terms of the monitoring program 
only when the violations “trigger the issuance of a[n] [arrest] 
warrant”71 and contact between the defendant and the victim is 
prohibited.72  
 Victims and Defense Counsel Interaction  
An elusive early version of HB 567 (not on file in the clerk’s 
office) sparked a battle in the Judiciary Committee.73 This version 
created Code section 17-17-8.1.74 Prosecutors and defense attorneys 
circulated dueling memos before the March 11, 2010 hearing 
between the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and 
                                                                                                                 
 68. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 4, p.4, ln. 97–99, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem.  
 69. Id. § 4, p.4, ln. 110–14. 
 70. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1 hr., 41 min., 3 sec. (remarks by unnamed Parole 
Board representative). 
 71. Id.; HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 8, p.8, ln. 255, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 72. HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 8, p.8, ln. 253–56, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.   
 73. See Samuel Interview, supra note 5. 
 74. HB 567 (LC29 4112ERS), § 1, p.10–11, ln. 336–60, 2010, Ga. Gen. Assem. (on file with 
Georgia State University Law Review).  
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the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council.75 The heavily disputed Code 
section 17-17-8.1 provides specifically for the right of the victim to 
refuse or limit the scope of an interview by the accused or the 
agent/attorney of the accused.76 Subsection (c) provided for an 
attorney-client-like relationship between the victim and the 
prosecutor:77  
(c) If specifically requested by the victim, the prosecuting 
attorney shall advise the accused or the accused’s attorney in 
writing that the victim has directed that they shall communicate 
with the victim only through the prosecuting attorney or his or 
her designee. Once the accused has been so notified, the 
prosecuting attorney shall promptly inform the victim of the 
accused’s request for an interview.78 
Additionally, subsection (f) provided for criminal contempt of court 
punishment for any violation of this section.79   
The Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (GACDL) 
vigorously objected to the aforementioned subsections.80 Members 
Don Samuel, Sandra Michaels, and Jack Martin wrote a memo to the 
Judiciary Committee after this section found its way into this early 
version of the bill.81 They argued that it was the duty of a defense 
attorney to attempt to interview any witness who may have 
information about the facts of the case, and that empowering the 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See generally id. The version of the bill with the controversial language referenced was 
circulated in part with the aforementioned memorandum before the March 11, 2010 hearing. Id. § 1, 
p.10–11, ln. 348–52, 2010, Ga. Gen. Assem. (on file with Georgia State University Law Review).  
 76. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-18.1 (Supp. 2010).  
 77. See Memorandum from Ga. Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights 
Section 11 to the Ga. House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2010) (on file with Ga. State Law Review). See 
generally Samuel Interview, supra note 5. 
 78. HB 567 (LC29 4112ERS), § 11, p. 10–11, ln. 348–52, p. 10–11, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. (on file 
with Georgia State University Law Review). 
 79. Id. § 11, p. 10–11, ln. 359–60 (on file with Georgia State University Law Review); 
Memorandum from Ga. Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights Section 11 
to the Ga. House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2010) (on file with Ga. State Law Review). 
 80. Memorandum from Ga. Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights 
Section 11 to the Ga. House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2010) (on file with Ga. State Law Review). 
 81. Id. 
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District Attorney to advise the victim of his rights “skews the role of 
counsel in the pretrial stage of a trial.”82  
Additionally, the GACDL members argued that it was 
unconstitutional to hold defense counsel in contempt based on a letter 
from the District Attorney.83 Such a procedure interferes with the 
Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants to zealous 
representation and the ethical duty of an attorney to provide it.84 
Moreover, they argued, a prosecutor is prohibited from interfering 
with a defense attorney’s right to interview witnesses.85 
In response to the GACDL, Spencer Lawton stated that a 
compromise between prosecutors and defense attorneys was “beyond 
reach” with regards to section 11 and insisted that the purpose of the 
section was to protect victims from unwanted contact by the 
defense.86 Lawton argued that the bill merely codified existing rights 
victims already have (to refuse an interview) and powers prosecutors 
already have (to advise victims of their rights).87 While agreeing that 
victims are not an actual party to a criminal action, he said that the 
relationship between a prosecutor and a victim “demands that the 
prosecutor be able to protect the victim from assault.”88   
The House subcommittee later removed the language that the 
defense attorney “shall communicate with the victim only through the 
prosecutor attorney or his or her designee.”89 Moreover, the provision 
providing for criminal contempt penalties was deleted.90 In place of 
the old language, the bill provides that the victim may refuse an 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (holding that 
failure to examine the defendant’s criminal history and uncover relevant mitigating circumstances 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel).   
 85. Memorandum from the Ga. Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers on Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights 
Section 11 to the Ga. House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2010) (on file with Georgia State University Law 
Review); see Sosebee v. State, 190 Ga. App. 746, 748, 380 S.E.2d 464, 466 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing 
Rutledge v. State, 245 Ga. 768, 267 S.E.2d 199 (1980)).  
 86. Memorandum from the Prosecuting Attorney’s Council on HB 567 – Crime Victims’ Bill of 
Rights (Section 11) to the House Judiciary Comm. (non-Civil) Ramsey Subcomm. (Mar. 10, 2010) (on 
file with Georgia State University Law Review).  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Compare HB 567 (LC29 4112ERS), § 11, p.10–11, ln. 348–52, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. with HB 
567 (LC29 4284S), § 1, p.10–11, ln. 324–46, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 90. HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 1, p.1, ln. 324–46, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
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interview and a defense attorney may not contact a victim in an 
“unreasonable manner.”91  
Passage by the House 
On March 26, 2010, the final version of HB 567 was presented to 
the House by Representative Don Parsons (R-47th).92 Representative 
Stephanie Benfield (D-85th) thanked the members of the Judiciary 
Non-Civil Committee for resolving the controversy with regards to 
section 11 and a defense attorney’s access to the victim.93 She was 
pleased with the final result.94 Representative Bobby Reese (R-98th) 
asked why a social security number would need to be provided and 
wondered why the bill did not provide for email contact as a cost-
saving measure.95 Representative Parsons replied that the social 
security number would be necessary for restitution purposes and that 
it was a big step for Georgia to expand contact methods beyond a 
land telephone.96 Representative Reese agreed to the change in the 
victim contact method, commenting, “Sometimes you gotta [sic] take 
what you can get,” and remarked that he wished this bill would have 
been passed several years ago.97  
Finally, Representative Bobby Franklin (R-43rd) rose to speak 
against the bill.98 He warned members of the house against 
“assert[ing] this body is God” by suggesting that rights come from 
civil government.99 While he agreed with the bill’s intentions, he was 
very concerned about referring to the newly mandated procedures as 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See id. § 1, p.1, ln. 337, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 92. Video Recording of Georgia House of Representatives House Session Mar. 26, 2010 at 1 min. 
[hereinafter House Session]. 
 93. Id. at 9 min., 36 sec.; see also supra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.  
 94. House Session, supra note 92, at 9 min., 36 sec. 
 95. Id. at 10 min., 10 sec. 
 96. Id. at 11 min. 
 97. Id. at 12 min., 10 sec. However, Representative Reese later voted “nay” on the Senate substitute 
version, even though it retained the unchanged and completely identical provisions and wording 
regarding victim rights. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 567 (Apr. 21, 2001); see 
also infra note 107. 
 98. House Session, supra note 92, at 13 min.  
 99. Id. at 15 min. 
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“rights” entitled to the victim.100 Subsequently, voting commenced 
and the bill passed 158 to 1.101  
Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
HB 567 was sponsored in the Senate by Senator John Wiles (R-
37th) and was read for the first time on March 30, 2010.102 Senate 
President Pro Tempore Tommie Williams (R-19th) assigned it to the 
Senate Special Judiciary Committee, which favorably reported on 
April 1, 2010.103 The committee drafted a substitute to the House 
version of HB 567, but changed none of the existing bill language.104  
The only addition to HB 567 made in the Senate substitute is the 
addition of amendments to Code section 42-5-50, deleting a provision 
that allowed convicted defendants to be housed in local jails during 
the appellate process instead of being processed into the state prison 
system immediately.105 The addition of this Code section does not 
appear related to the overall theme of crime victims’ rights that 
otherwise unifies the Act. In the end, the Senate passed the bill 
unanimously on April 14, 2010, with no objections or debate.106  
Passage of the Senate Substitute by the House 
On April 21, 2010, the House agreed to the Senate substitute by a 
vote of 151 to 2.107 The bill was then sent to the Governor on May 
10, 2010.108 HB 567 became Act 403 upon being signed into law by 
Governor Sonny Perdue on May 20, 2010.109 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 16 min., 15 sec. The single “nay” vote was from Representative Bobby Franklin (R-43rd). 
Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 567 (Mar. 26, 2001). 
 102. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 567, Apr. 29, 2010. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See generally HB 567 (LC35 1866S), 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. (all sections are identical to HB 567 
(LC29 4284S) except for Section 17). 
 105. Id. § 17, p. 15, ln. 488–500, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 106. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 567, Apr. 29, 2010. 
 107. The two “nay” votes were cast by Representative Bobby Franklin and Representative Bobby 
Reese. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 567 (Apr. 21, 2001). 
 108. See Georgia General Assembly, HB 567, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10 
/sum/hb567.htm. 
 109. Id.  
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The Act 
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Act deal with juvenile court 
proceedings.110 The most significant part of the revisions to the 
existing juvenile Code sections is section 1, which gives victims the 
right to address the court prior to the entry of a dispositional order in 
juvenile court,111 aligning with the procedure in adult proceedings.112 
The original Code section 15-11-64.2 provided for submission of 
victim impact statements but made no mention of whether victims 
were allowed to give oral testimony about their experience related to 
the case in juvenile court.113 This change was made to ensure 
consistency and “simply to conform juvenile procedure, with regard 
to victim impact evidence, to the procedures that prevail in the adult 
system.”114 For victim advocates a key feature of HB 567 is being 
allowed to speak to the court instead of being limited to a paper 
impact statement. 
The amended Code section 15-11-64.2 permits a victim to speak to 
the court, if the victim chooses, about the impact of the delinquent act 
on themselves or their family, the need for restitution, or the terms of 
the disposition order.115 Any statement presented by the victim has to 
be given in the presence of the allegedly delinquent child, and the 
victim must be subject to cross examination.116 The prosecuting 
attorney and the allegedly delinquent child also have the opportunity 
to explain, support, or deny the victim’s statement.117  
The amended Code section also charges the juvenile court with 
telling the victim of their right to address the court.118 If the victim 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Although the first three sections of the Act make major changes to juvenile court proceedings, 
the sponsors of HB 567 reported that no one from the juvenile justice reform project or any juvenile 
court judges or defense attorneys were contacted when this provision was drafted, so the impact of this 
language is uncertain. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 48 min., 13 sec. 
 111. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64.2(d) (Supp. 2010). 
 112. The right to address the court in adult proceedings was established in 2009. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-
1.2 (Supp. 2009); House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 38 min., 22 sec (remarks by Charles 
Olson, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). 
 113. See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64.2 (Supp. 2009).  
 114. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 26 min., 39 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). 
 115. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64.2(d) (Supp. 2010). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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chooses not to appear at the dispositional hearing, they are considered 
to have waived their rights under this section.119  
Similar to the amended Code section 17-17-10.2 in section 4 of the 
Act, juvenile court victims are also given the right to file a complaint 
with the Judicial Qualifications Commission if the court intentionally 
fails to comply with the amended Code section.120 
Section 2 amends Code section 15-11-78, adding victims to the 
parties that are allowed to be present during juvenile court 
proceedings.121  
Section 3 of the Act amends Code section 15-11-155, regarding 
dispositional hearings for mental competency plans in juvenile 
court.122 The Act merely replaces the word ‘statement’ for victim 
impact ‘form.’123 
Section 4 amends Code section 17-10-1.2, which deals with oral 
victim impact statements in adult criminal proceedings.124 The Act 
adds language giving prosecutors the right to make a proffer of 
victim impact evidence if the judge chooses to exclude part of the 
testimony.125 As in section 1 of the Act, the victim has the right under 
this Code section to file a complaint with the Judicial Qualifications 
Commission if the court intentionally fails to comply with this 
section.126  
The remainder of this section provides that if the case involves a 
serious felony127 and the victim or their representative is not present 
in court during the presentence hearing, the court must determine 
whether the prosecutor properly notified the victim.128 If the 
prosecutor did not do so, then the proceedings are stopped until the 
victim is located and to allow the victim to travel to the court.129 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Id. 
 120. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-64.2(e) (Supp. 2010).  
 121. Id. § 15-11-78(e). 
 122. Id. § 15-11-55(b). 
 123. Id.   
 124. Id. § 17-10-1.2. 
 125. Id. § 17-10-1.2(a)(3). 
 126. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2(a)(3) (Supp. 2010); id. § 15-11-64.2(e). 
 127. The term ‘violent felony’ is defined in Code section 17-10-6.1 and includes murder or felony 
murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, and 
aggravated child molestation, unless the offense is charged as a misdemeanor subject to the provisions 
of paragraph two of subsection (d) of Code Section 16-6-4. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1 (Supp. 2009). 
 128. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2(a)(5) (Supp. 2010). 
 129. Id. 
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However, if the accused or the state has witnesses present to testify, 
then those witnesses will be called before the hearing is recessed.130  
Section 5 of the Act amends Code section 17-14-3, which deals 
with restitution.131 The language added here requires the court to 
make a specific finding of the amount of restitution owed to the 
victim when sentencing the defendant.132 Formerly, the court could 
simply order that restitution was owed without determining the dollar 
amount,133 making collection difficult. For example, the parole board 
is authorized to enforce restitution orders, but only if the court 
specified the amount due.134   
Even if the amount cannot be collected immediately because the 
defendant is indigent, the judgment remains effective if and when the 
defendant possesses sufficient resources to pay.135 The restitution 
order is treated like a civil judgment and provides the same rights, 
such as garnishing the defendant’s wages.136  
Section 6 of the Act amends Code section 17-17-1, which 
collectively lists all of the victims’ rights granted by the Code.137 
Most of the language is unchanged from the House Subcommittee 
version of HB 567, except that the right not to be excluded from the 
courtroom was strengthened, and one new right was added.138 The 
previous version of the bill permitted the judge to exclude the victim 
if “after receiving clear and convincing evidence [the court] 
determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. § 17-14-3(a). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id.; see House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1hr., 7 min., 12 sec (remarks by Spencer 
Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council) (“[T]he code now says that the court shall impose restitution, 
but . . .  if they don't, nothing comes of it.”). 
 134.  See House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1hr., 17 min., 2 sec (remarks by Charles Olson, 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). 
 135. Id. at 1hr., 8 min., 31 sec (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). 
 136. Id. at 1 hr., 16 min., 20 sec. (remarks by Representative Matt Ramsey (R-72nd)). However, the 
granting of broad recovery rights does not signify that the types of restitution damages allowed are 
similarly expanded. Discussion on this issue was somewhat conflicting, but it appears that damages 
based on a wrongful death claim would be considered restitution but loss of consortium damages would 
not. See id. at 1 hr., 18 min., 55 sec. (remarks by Representative Doug Collins (R-27); Charles Olson, 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council; Representative Ed Setzler (R-35th)). 
 137. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1(3) (Supp. 2010).   
 138. Compare HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.1, ln. 17–21, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. with O.C.G.A. § 17-
17-1(3) (Supp. 2010).   
19
: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Crime Victims' Bill of Rights
Published by Reading Room, 2010
48 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1 
 
 
the victim heard testimony from a witness,”139 while the Act also 
permits exclusion if it is otherwise required by law.140 Therefore, the 
Act eliminates the court’s exercise of discretion regarding exclusion 
of the victim. 
Section 7 of this version revises Code section 17-17-3, which 
provides definitions of terms used in this title. Under the new 
definition of “victim,” a person is considered a victim even if it is not 
certain that a crime has actually been committed.141 The new terms 
added and defined by the subcommittee in this version are “arrest”142 
and “criminal justice agency.”143 
Sections 8 and 9 add new events to provide notification “of 
changes in a defendant’s status, times when a victim might 
reasonably feel some anxiety about the defendant’s status change, 
and we want them to know what’s going on.”144 The new code 
sections provide extra protection to victims and will increase the 
victim’s safety and sense of well-being.  
Section 8 amends Code section 17-17-5, concerning the manner 
victims would be notified of changes in the case. The existing Code 
language, which was enacted in 1995, provided that the contact 
number for the victim could not be a “pocket pager or electronic 
communication device number.”145 This version was updated to 
encompass current technology and delete that limitation, permitting 
cellular phone numbers to be used to contact victims, as well as 
electronic mail addresses and mailing addresses.146  
                                                                                                                 
 139. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p.1, ln. 17–21, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.  
 140. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1(3) (Supp. 2010). This limitation now applies to immediate family members 
of a victim. Id. § 17-17-9(a).  
 141. Id. § 17-17-3(11)(A). 
 142. Id. § 17-17-3(1.1) (“An actual custodial restraint of a person or the person's submission to 
custody and includes the taking of a child into custody.”). 
 143. Id. § 17-17-3(4.1) (“An arresting law enforcement agency, custodial authority, investigating law 
enforcement agency, prosecuting attorney, or the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.”). 
 144. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1 hr., 43 min., 2 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). 
 145. 1995 Ga. Laws 385, § 2, at 385 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 17-17-5 (Supp. 2009)). 
 146. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-5 (Supp. 2010). An earlier version of the bill listed different specific contact 
methods, HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 2, p. 2, ln. 50–52, 55–58, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem., but the Act requires 
instead “[a] current address and telephone number.” O.C.G.A. § 17-7-5(b),(c) (Supp. 2010). A previous 
version of the Act also provided that a victim could be notified via multiple means of communication if 
that was what they requested. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 2, p. 2, ln. 52–53, 55–58, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
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Section 8 also provides that victims must be notified when the 
defendant escapes and if and when he is rearrested,147 as well as 
when the defendant is released and ordered to participate in an 
electronic monitoring program.148 
Section 9 creates new Code section 17-17-5.1, which requires, 
upon written request, victim notification at least ten days before the 
defendant is released if the defendant was committed to the 
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities.149 
Notification is also required if the defendant escapes from that 
custody.150 This requirement was added because some victims, 
unaware that the defendant was no longer in custody, only learned of 
the defendant’s release when the defendant appeared at their home.151 
In addition, under the existing Code section, if the defendant was 
incompetent to stand trial and released from custody, the victim did 
not get notified.152  
Section 10 amends Code section 17-17-8, first by providing a 
procedural avenue for victims to recover their possessions from the 
police when the items are no longer needed for evidentiary 
purposes.153 This provision was included because there was often 
confusion and miscommunication between the victim, police 
department, and the district attorney’s office.154 Second, this section 
describes the information155 victims need to supply if restitution is 
sought and also requires that the prosecuting attorney transmit that 
information to the relevant agency after informing the victim that 
they will be doing so.156  
Section 11 creates Code section 17-17-8.1 detailing procedures 
involving interaction between the victim and the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                 
 147. HB 567 (LC29 4284S), § 8, p.9, ln. 251, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem.  
 148. Id. § 8, p.9, ln. 252–53. 
 149. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-5.1(a) (Supp. 2010).  
 150. Id. § 17-17-5.1(b).  
 151. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 1 hr., 49 min., 42 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). 
 152. Id. at 1 hr., 49 min., 40 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). 
 153. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-8(a)(5) (Supp. 2010). 
 154. See House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 53 min., 2 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council, and Rep. Doug Collins (R-27th)). 
 155. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-8(c)(1) (Supp. 2010). All information provided for this purpose is confidential, 
cannot be used as evidence in any trial, and is not subject to subpoena or discovery. Id. § 17-17-8(c)(3). 
 156. Id. § 17-17-8(c)(1), (2). 
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attorney, which generated significant controversy as discussed earlier 
in this article.157 The victim is given the right to terminate, refuse, or 
set conditions on any interview.158 Contact initiated by the defendant 
or the defendant’s agent cannot be made in an unreasonable manner, 
and the victim can request that no contact be attempted.159 The 
protection of the victim is tempered by the mandate that prohibits 
prosecuting attorneys from wrongly obstructing the defendant’s 
access to the victim for interviews.160 
Section 12 expands the prohibition on exclusion to include 
victim’s family during criminal proceedings by revising Code section 
17-17-9,161 and victim exclusion from proceedings is covered in 
section 16 amending Code section 24-9-61.1.162 The theme of 
encompassing family into the protected relationships is repeated in 
section 15, which creates Code section 17-17-12.1 and describes the 
procedure for blocking inmate mail.163 Another expansion of 
protection is the application of attorney-work product status to 
communications between the victim and victim advocate personnel 
through creation of Code section 17-17-9.1 in section 13.164  
Section 13 of the Act creates Code section 17-17-19.1, which 
establishes that any communication between the victim and victim 
assistance personnel appointed by the prosecuting attorney is 
considered attorney-work product.165 This means those 
communications are only subject to disclosure when it is required by 
law.166 The purpose of this provision is to increase the victim’s 
feeling of confidentiality during the court process.  
Section 14 of the Act amends Code section 17-17-12 regarding 
notification of appellate proceedings, the release of the defendant on 
bail or recognizance, or the defendant’s motion for new trial or 
appeal.167 It also amends Code section 17-17-12 to require the 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. § 17-17-8.1; see supra discussion pp. 17–20. 
 158. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-8.1(a), (b) (Supp. 2010). 
 159. Id. § 17-17-8.1(a), (c). 
 160. Id. § 17-17-8.1(e).  
 161. Id. § 17-17-9(a). 
 162. Id. § 24-9-61.1.  
 163. Id. § 17-17-12.1.  
 164. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-9.1 (Supp. 2010).  
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. § 17-17-12. 
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prosecuting attorney to tell the victim that they need to request such 
notification in writing.168 Once requested, the prosecuting attorney 
provides notification to the victim.169 The victim’s right to 
notification continues through any further trial court proceedings 
ordered by the Court of Appeals.170 
Section 15 of the Act creates Code section 17-17-12.1, which 
outlines the procedures used to prevent inmates from contacting 
victims or the victim’s family or household by mail.171 “Mail” is 
defined in this Code section as follows: 
any form of written communication, including, but not limited to, 
letters, cards, postcards, packages, parcels, . . . e-mail, . . . text 
messaging, and any other form of electronic communication 
which is knowingly intended to be delivered to or received by a 
victim, any member of the victim's family, or any member of the 
victim's household.172 
The juvenile court, or the prosecuting attorney in adult court, is 
required to provide information to the victim about the mail blocking 
process.173 The Department of Corrections and the Department of 
Juvenile Justice are required to create a detailed system describing 
how the victim can block inmate mail.174 If the victim requests that 
mail be blocked, the appropriate agency175 must transmit the victim’s 
contact information176 to the custodial authority, notify the inmate of 
the mail block, and implement measures to prevent the inmate 
violating the mail block.177  
                                                                                                                 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-9.1 (Supp. 2010).. 
 171. Id. § 17-17-12.1. 
 172. Id. § 17-17-12.1(a). 
 173. Id. § 17-17-12.1(b)(3). 
 174. Id. § 17-17-12.1(c). 
 175. The agency would be either the Department of Corrections in adult superior court cases or the 
Department of Juvenile Justice in Juvenile cases. Id. 
 176. The victim’s information will not be available to the public and is not subject to discovery unless 
the court decides that the information is material and relevant to the case and provides information not 
available from any other source. O.C.G.A. § 17-17-12.1(g) (Supp. 2010). 
 177. Id. § 17-17-12.1(d). 
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Section 16 amending Code section 24-9-61.1 adds a reference to 
Code section 17-17-9 regarding the victim’s right to be present in the 
courtroom.178 
Section 17 of the Act amends Code section 42-5-50, regarding 
inmates—how and when defendants are processed into the penal 
system.179 The new language requires convicted defendants to be 
moved into the state system as soon as the administrative 
requirements are met and no longer provides for exceptions due to 
ongoing court proceedings in the same case.180 
Analysis 
In the end, the essential purpose of HB 567 is to provide substance 
to the sentiment that Georgia should provide basic rights to victims of 
crime and their families.181 Accordingly, the bill focuses on providing 
for the right of victims to be present and heard, to be notified, and to 
be provided restitution where appropriate.182 Additionally, the bill 
provides guidance to various agencies in carrying out the state’s long-
standing policy to accord basic rights to victims of crime.183 
Specifically, victims of crime in Georgia (including relatives of 
victims) now enjoy the following rights: the right to reasonable notice 
regarding criminal proceedings; the right to reasonable notice 
regarding the arrest, release, or escape of the accused; the right not to 
be excluded from court proceedings except as required by law, 
including juvenile proceedings; the right to be heard in proceedings 
involving the release, plea, or sentencing of the accused; the right to 
file a written objection in parole proceedings involving the accused; 
the right to confer with the prosecuting attorney; the right to 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. § 24-9-61.1. 
 179. Id. § 42-5-50. 
 180. Compare 2004 Ga. Laws 595, § 2 (formerly codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-5-50) (Supp. 2009)) with 
HB 567 (LC35 1866S), § 17, p. 15, ln. 488–500, 2010 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 181. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 23 min., 51 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton of 
Prosecuting Attorney’s Council).  
 182. See HB 567, as introduced, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 183. See O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1 (Supp. 2009); see, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 17-17-5 (Supp. 2010); O.C.G.A. § 
17-17-5.1 (Supp. 2010) (providing guidance as to how various agencies are responsible for keeping 
victims informed about the status of the accused or offender).  
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restitution; the right to proceedings free of unreasonable delay; and 
the right to be treated fairly and with dignity.184 
Crime victims’ advocate Drew Crecente recalls from his own 
experience as the father of a homicide victim that he felt ignored by 
the criminal justice system.185 He was kept in the dark by prosecutors 
about a relatively lenient plea prosecutors negotiated with the 
offender and was surprised when prosecutors failed to secure the 
offender’s testimony in order to bring an accomplice to justice.186 
Crecente says that it is important for society to recognize that it is not 
just the state who has suffered a loss, but the loved ones of the victim 
as well.187 “Communication, information, and knowledge [are] so 
important,” he remarks.188  
On the other hand, it is unclear how a victim, under HB 567, can 
compel a court to comply with the law and force the court to hear 
from him or her. As the later hearings made clear, the goal of the bill 
is not to make the victim into a party in a criminal case, which, 
according to Spencer Lawton of the Prosecuting Attorneys Council, 
would “have devastating consequences for the system at its root.”189 
For example, while the Act was designed to prevent judges from 
deciding that they do not want to hear from a victim, the Prosecuting 
Attorneys’ Council wants to avoid cases going up on appeal because 
the victim was not heard from in a given case.190 Lawton is 
concerned that giving victims this standing in Georgia’s process, 
where sentencing is not necessarily a separate hearing from the 
verdict, would be problematic for the system.191 
While Dr. Bruce Cook from the Crime Victims Advocacy Council 
feels crime victims are getting “the best we could get” in Georgia, he 
is disappointed that victims do not have standing, the right to 
appellate review, and the right to obtain a writ of mandamus if either 
prosecutors fail to notify them or they are not present to make a 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See generally O.C.G.A. § 17-17-1 (Supp. 2010). 
 185. See Interview with Drew Crecente, Founder of Jennifer Ann’s Group, a non-profit organization 
dedicated to the prevention of teen dating violence (Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Crecente Interview].  
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 32 min. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, Prosecuting 
Attorneys’ Council).  
 190. Id. at 47 min. 
 191. Id. at 29 min., 38 sec.  
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statement during sentencing.192 Dr. Cook says, in this sense, the bill 
essentially has “no teeth” and is “tantamount to a suggestion” if 
prosecutors fail to notify victims about their rights.193 Finally, he does 
not see why, for example, federal courts and Arizona can give 
victims standing while Georgia cannot. It seems likely that, if 
prosecutors consistently or egregiously fail to comply with their 
obligations under HB 567, crime victims may advocate for stronger 
legislation.194   
This issue of where victims fit exactly in the criminal justice 
system model is a continuing problem. Spencer Lawton notes that in 
other states with similar provisions, and in the federal courts, this 
type of power given to victims has resulted in appellate courts 
overturning sentences and remanding for new sentencing hearings at 
which victims are granted their respective rights concerning the 
case.195 Although an early version of the Act tried to constrain this 
right by stating that a continuance to address the victim’s claims 
could not last longer than five days,196 it is unclear how that would 
have actually been executed. 
The affected parties seem satisfied with the committee’s work in 
resolving the section 11 controversy. Don Samuel says that he and his 
colleagues in the Georgia Criminal Defense Lawyer’s association 
(GACDL) are happy with the changes to section 11.197 Additionally, 
Don Parsons feels “very good” about the Act and reports that crime 
victims in Cobb County are pleased with the end result of the 
legislative push to improve the state of victim’s rights in Georgia.198 
He says that the criminal defense lawyers are “okay with it also.”199 
He further explains that the Act was never intended to interfere with 
the constitutional rights of the accused, but only to codify what 
should be understood, that victims should be left alone if they wish 
and never contacted in an unreasonable or unprofessional manner by 
                                                                                                                 
 192. See Cook Interview, supra note 27. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See generally id. 
 195. House Comm. Jan. 5 Video, supra note 2, at 29 min., 25 sec. (remarks by Spencer Lawton, 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council). 
 196. HB 567 (LC35 1317), § 1, p. 2, ln. 38–40, 2009 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 197. Samuel Interview, supra note 5. 
 198. Parsons Interview, supra note 26.  
 199. See id. 
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an attorney representing the accused.200 As it stands, HB 567 was 
enacted in a way that aims to avoid a legal challenge by GACDL.201 
If the Supreme Court were to overrule Payne,202 HB 567 may face 
an Eighth Amendment challenge, particularly as applied to cases 
where the death penalty is sought. Georgia law now mandates that 
judges allow victim impact statements to be offered “in all cases in 
which the death penalty may be imposed.”203 Likewise, the Maryland 
law struck down by the Supreme Court in Booth mandated that the 
presentence report in all felony cases include a victim impact 
statement.204 Potential challenges to the admissibility of victim 
impact statements may insist that the harm done to the victim is 
irrelevant to the “character of the offense and character of the 
offender.”205 From Payne’s dissenting reasoning it follows that 
victim impact statements are “constitutionally irrelevant” under the 
Eighth Amendment; thus, allowing them to factor into a sentencing 
decision increases the likelihood that the death penalty will be 
applied arbitrarily based on emotion rather than reasoned 
judgment.206 
In the end, while all affected parties are generally optimistic that 
Georgia has taken a significant step in the right direction, only time 
will tell if the state will live up to its stated policy objective: making 
the criminal justice system more responsive and helpful to those most 
affected by crimes, the victims and their survivors.  
Cameron Carpino & Christopher DeNeve    
                                                                                                                 
 200. Id. 
 201. See, e.g., House Session, supra note 92, at 3 min. (remarks by Rep. Stephanie Benfield (D-85th), 
thanking Rep. Parsons for working to eliminate the concerns of criminal defense attorneys).  
 202. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 203. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 (Supp. 2010). 
 204. MD. ANN. CODE of 1957, art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986). See generally Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496, 498 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 205. Payne, 501 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 206. Id. 
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